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Achieving better performance through target cost contracts –  
The tale of an underground railway station modification project 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This paper aims to explore the implementation framework, project performance, 
underlying motives, perceived benefits, potential difficulties as well as critical success 
factors of adopting the target cost contracting (TCC) form of procurement, based on an in-
depth real-life case study of a challenging underground railway station modification 
project in Hong Kong. 
Design/methodology/approach – The case project was analysed by means of the related 
project documentation and face-to-face interviews with the relevant senior representatives 
from the client organisation. 
Findings – The target cost-based procurement strategy generates a plethora of benefits 
throughout the whole delivery process of the project case, including the provision of cost 
incentives for the contractor to work efficiently, aligning individual goals of various 
contracting parties with the overall project objectives, achieving better value for money 
and more satisfactory overall project performance in terms of time, cost and dispute 
occurrence. 
Practical limitations/implications – Although the selected TCC case study project is 
based in Hong Kong, the research findings and hands-on experience of the relevant 
industrial practitioners may be cross-referenced to other similar TCC projects in other 
parts of the world for international comparisons. 
Originality/value – The research study has provided some useful insights into assisting 
key project stakeholders in maximising the benefits, whilst minimising the detriments 
brought about by potential difficulties in launching the TCC scheme. It attempts to seek 
more research evidence to evaluate the entire project delivery process, and capture the 
levels of success and lessons learned from previous TCC construction projects for 
generating best practice recommendations to achieve better construction performance. 
 
Keywords: Target cost contracting, Procurement strategies, Gain-share/pain-share 
arrangement, Performance measurement, Case study, Hong Kong 
Paper type: Case study 
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Introduction 
 
The procurement method holds the key of success for delivering construction services 
(Chan and Yung, 2003). Strong concerns have thus been raised within the construction 
industry for adopting alternative integrated procurement strategies to supersede the 
traditional design-bid-build approach with the concomitant problems of fragmented 
working relationship and the lack of incentive for project team members to contribute 
more than just meeting the minimum contractual requirements (Masterman, 2002). 
Consequently,  target cost contracting (TCC), accompanied by a gain-share/pain-share 
arrangement serving as a cost incentive mechanism, has emerged in the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Australia with the aim of achieving better value for money and more 
satisfactory overall project performance (National Economic Development Office, 1982; 
Trench, 1991). 
 
The Construction Industry Review Committee (2001) of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) also recommended the application of TCC in construction. 
Under the umbrella of TCC, a fixed target cost is set based on given parameters at the 
outset of a project. If this fixed target cost is fallen short of or exceeded, the financial 
gain/pain is split between the contracting parties in accordance with a pre-agreed share 
ratio. The theory goes that by incentivising the contractor, he will attempt to minimise 
costs and to achieve value for money. By providing a proper performance-based 
remuneration, the contractor’s financial interests and those of the client become more 
aligned (Wong, 2006). An attractive by-product of this form of contracting is that since the 
opportunity for gain-share/pain-share is best realised by working closely with, rather than 
being simply instructed by, the employer, partnering spirit is thereby cultivated (Longley, 
2006). Hence, a target cost contract produces the desirable “win-win” situation for both 
client and contractor.   
 
Although TCC has been practised in construction for several years, not all projects 
procured by TCC have been equally successful as anticipated. Empirical research is very 
limited to scrutinise the overall delivery process, the levels of success and lessons learned 
from TCC projects. It is therefore valuable to conduct an in-depth case study of TCC 
applications to explore its implementation process for achieving construction excellence. 
Hence, this study aims to evaluate a successful underground infrastructure modification 
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project: the “Tsim Sha Tsui Underground Railway Station Modification and Extension 
Works” which was the first fully “open-book” target cost contract in Hong Kong. 
 
Two senior industrial practitioners representing the client organisation were interviewed 
and relevant documentation of the case study project were reviewed to examine the 
operational mechanism of TCC, and to solicit their opinions on the motives behind 
introducing TCC, the benefits, difficulties and success factors of implementing the TCC 
scheme. Most importantly, various lessons learned from this successful case study project 
in relation to overall project performance are presented and discussed herein.  
 
Although the empirical findings and direct hands-on experience from an individual project 
may not be generalised or regarded as conclusive, the Tsim Sha Tsui Underground 
Railway Station Modification Works project has demonstrated a useful and indicative 
example illustrating the successful TCC experience for a large-scale underground 
infrastructure modification project based on the lessons learned. This paper begins by 
briefly portraying the underlying concepts of a target cost contract in construction. The 
major benefits, difficulties and success factors of applying TCC are also briefly reviewed 
from the reported literature. The research methodology including the research framework 
and methods of data collection are then highlighted. It is followed by the empirical results 
of a case study including the key features of TCC, motives behind as well as the benefits 
and difficulties of implementing the TCC scheme. The critical success factors and the 
lessons learned from the case study project are also evaluated. These are then followed by 
discussions of the applications and implications of the case study findings, before the 
conclusions are drawn. 
 
Concepts of target cost contracting (TCC) 
 
In the United Kingdom, the National Economic Development Office – Civil Engineering 
(1982) defined TCC as: “Target cost contracts specify a best estimate of the cost of the 
work to be carried out. During the course of the work, the initial target cost will be 
adjusted by agreement between the client or his nominated representative and the 
contractor is to allow for any changes to the original specification. Any savings or 
overruns between target cost and actual cost at completion are shared between the parties 
to the contract with a pre-determined share ratio set out in the contract.”  
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In Hong Kong, the Mass Transit Railway Corporation (2003) explained TCC principle in 
that “the client and the contractor would share savings (gains) if the final actual cost of 
completing the work turns out to be less than the target cost. Should the final out-turn cost 
exceed the target cost, they would share the excess (pain)”. TCC is therefore a unique 
arrangement that shifts the fixed price approach to a target cost approach based on joint 
determination and agreement between the client and the contractor on the allocation of 
shared risks. This form of procurement method is much more than a form of contract 
setting out the rights and obligations of the contracting parties. It is a method of working 
that requires both the client and the contractor to work together more closely than they 
would under most other contractual arrangements, to manage the costs of the work for 
mutual benefit (Longley, 2006).  
 
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the definition and operational mechanism of TCC contracts. 
Under the operational strategy of TCC, an agreed target price and a gain-share/pain-share 
mechanism of a project are thereby established in the construction contract under this 
agreement (Clough and Sears, 1994; Cantirino and Fodor, 2003). The contractor usually 
includes a sum for future design development and for unforeseeable risks (Gander and 
Hemsley, 1997). Figure 2 provides a hypothetical example to demonstrate the 
implementation of this gain-share/pain-share philosophy for TCC construction projects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Operational mechanism of TCC procurement strategy [Adapted from Cheng 
(2004)] 

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Figure 2. A hypothetical example for illustrating the gain-share/pain-share mechanism of 
the TCC procurement approach [Adapted from the Hong Kong Housing Authority (2006)] 
 
Literature review of TCC key features 
 
An extensive review of contemporary literature was initially undertaken to investigate the 
underlying motives, perceived benefits, potential difficulties and critical success factors of 
the TCC methodology by the same research team (Chan et al., 2007a; Chan et al., 2007b) 
with their highlights provided below. 
 
Under the target cost contracts, the gain-share/pain-share mechanism offers strong 
financial incentives for the contractor to work efficiently and to achieve cost saving 
(Boukendour and Bah, 2001; Fan and Greenwood, 2004). Another possible advantage of 
implementing TCC is the improvement of construction quality. Conventional contracting 
methods may over-emphasise on price and sacrifice quality (Cheng, 2004). In sharp 
contrast, the TCC sets an agreed reasonable target price and facilitates the tendering of the 
FINAL OUT-TURN COST 
 Main contractor’s direct works 
 Accepted tender sums for domestic 
subcontractor’s works  
 Net cost adjustment for TCC variations 
 Net cost adjustment for design development 
 Net cost of direct loss and/or expense in 
accordance with contract documents 
FINAL TARGET COST 
 Contract target cost at tender stage 
 Net cost adjustment of TCC variations 
 Net cost adjustment of direct loss and/or 
expense for TCC variations 
If Out-Turn Cost LOWER 
than the Final TC: 
If Out-Turn Cost HIGHER 
than the Final TC: 
FINAL ACCOUNT 
SHARED SAVING 
Final TC:            80.0 
Out-Turn Cost:    74.0 
Saving:                6.0 
 
Shared between:- 
Employer  60%   3.6 
Contractor 40%    2.4 
SHARED LOSS 
Final TC:             80.0 
Out-Turn Cost                     85.0 
Loss:                          5.0 
 
Shared between:- 
Employer 60%    3.0 
Contractor 40%    2.0 
 
SHARED SAVING 
Contractor 40%=  2.4 
FINAL ACCOUNT 
Out-Turn Cost + 
Shared Saving by 
Contractor 
 
= 74.0 + 2.4  
= 76.4 
FINAL 
ACCOUNT (TCC) 
= Out-Turn Cost + 
Shared Loss by 
Employer 
 
= 80.0 + 3.0 
= 83.0 All values shown in HK$ million 
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domestic subcontractors’ works packages on an open basis, which ensures that the 
employer receives competitively priced tenders from approved subcontractors and 
specialists (Tay et al., 2000). This contracting approach therefore helps in selecting the 
right project team which has gained adequate experience and is capable to develop the 
client’s design intent (Trench, 1991). This form of procurement arrangement also 
eradicates the multi-layered subcontracting and maintains the quality standards of 
constructed facilities and workmanship. 
 
However, the major problem encountered whilst implementing the TCC approach may be 
the unclear definition of a scope change (Gander and Hemsley, 1997), causing potential 
disputes with the natural tendency of the client and contractor pulling in opposite 
directions to achieve their own objectives (Tay et al., 2000; Fan and Greenwood, 2004). 
The scope of contractor’s work, therefore, has to be clearly defined in the client’s project 
brief (Tang, 2005). Sadler (2004) added that scope changes/variations need to be kept to a 
minimum in order that the TCC contract can be administered as intended and that the 
approach might provide value for money in construction. 
 
A TCC scheme, like other standard cost-based contracts, usually requires that details of the 
contractor’s tender pricing for any TCC subcontract works packages be made fully 
available to the client through an “open-book” accounting arrangement. The contractor’s 
project accounts must be open for scrutiny by the client, and the client must satisfy himself 
that the contractor’s supporting staff on-site will include a strong administrative team and 
an accountant experienced in this procedure. The clients pay these costs to the contractor, 
subject to satisfactory checks of constructed facilities. The use of open-book accounting 
regime enables better accountability and quantification of the costs of risk (National 
Economic Development Office, 1982). 
 
Additionally, the TCC form of procurement requires a greater level of commitment and 
involvement by all project parties to the contract arising from tendering, not only for the 
main target cost contract, but also individually for the domestic subcontractor’s works 
packages (Tang and Lam, 2003). Furthermore, TCC is still a new concept within the local 
construction industry. Project participants might not be used to working in this novel way 
and may find it uncomfortable and difficult to change the traditional working style (Sadler, 
2004). The National Economic Development Office (1982) stressed that the successful 
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implementation of target cost contracts depends on a sound understanding by both the 
client and contractor of the principles underlying the procurement approach, and of the 
roles and relationships brought about by the use of this form of contract. 
 
Tay et al. (2000), on the other hand, postulated that there must be a genuine willingness to 
achieve co-operation or demonstrate partnering spirit between the contracting parties. This 
enables project participants to work together towards common goals and generate a 
teamwork culture to resolve disputes and to complete the project without having to revert 
to protracted contractual claims requiring litigious resolutions. A clear and fair allocation 
of risks between employer and contractor is thus vital (Mills and Harris, 1995). It is also 
imperative to tap in the expertise of the main contractor and suppliers during the design 
stage and before the design is finalised (Sadler, 2004). This enables technical advice on 
buildability and environmental issues to be integrated into the design by the contractor. 
 
Research methodology 
 
The overall research methodology comprises an in-depth case study of TCC. Yin (1981) 
defined a “case study” as an empirical inquiry that (1) investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context; (2) is appropriate when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and (3) incorporates multiple sources of 
evidence. Case studies are suitable for projects that are significant (Yin, 2009). The 
selected TCC project under scrutiny is a challenging underground railway station 
modification works in Hong Kong with a huge risk profile and tight schedule for 
completion. The major findings derived from this case study can assist in reaping the 
perceived benefits and exploring the implementation process of TCC contracts for 
achieving construction excellence for future projects. 
 
Two senior representatives from the client organisation (Mass Transit Railway 
Corporation Ltd) were interviewed in April of 2007 to collect in-depth information and 
data of the project and to solicit the perceptions of the underlying motives, benefits, 
difficulties and success factors of TCC based on the chosen case. Target interviewees from 
the main contractor organisation (Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd) could not be contacted due to 
the departure of the staff members concerned after project completion in September 2005. 
Each interview was launched at the interviewee’s office and lasted for about 1.5 hours. 
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One of the interviewees was the General Manager (Procurement and Contracts) and the 
other the Contracts Administration Manager (Operations) of the Mass Transit Railway 
Corporation Ltd. Both of them were well-experienced in construction contracting and 
heavily involved in the TCC procurement process of the selected project. Copies of 
relevant materials including the project’s scope of work, contract terms on TCC, in-house 
guidelines or best practice framework for implementing the TCC scheme, case reports, as 
well as on-line website materials were obtained as the secondary source of evidence to 
support primary opinions and information gleaned during the interviews. 
 
Since the two target interviewees were senior industrial practitioners having abundant 
experience with TCC schemes, the interviews were flexibly structured to facilitate free 
flow of ideas. The following open-ended questions were asked to convey a general idea of 
the information solicited, while the interviewees were encouraged to express their views 
on the subject, without being restrained by the preset questions related to the studied case:  
 
1. What is the implementation mechanism or current practice framework adopted for the 
TCC methodology? 
2. What are the motives behind the decision to implement TCC instead of traditional 
fixed-price lump-sum contract? 
3. What are the major benefits and difficulties in adopting TCC? 
4. What are the essential elements for successful TCC scheme? 
 
The information acquired from the interviews was first audio-recorded and later 
transcribed into written dialogues. The draft interview dialogues were forwarded to 
corresponding interviewees subsequently via email transmission for verification. A 
systematic account of information obtained from in-depth interviews was archived for 
subsequent analysis. Outcomes derived from the analysis of interview dialogues were 
cross-referenced to the literature review and triangulated with each other for validation. 
 
Case study: Tsim Sha Tsui Underground Railway Station Modification Works 
 
Background of the project 
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A comprehensive search of the background information and data regarding the selected 
project case was launched based on some seminar papers (Dunn and Jones, 2004; Avery, 
2006), together with online materials (Hong Kong Construction Innovation, 2006). The 
Tsim Sha Tsui (TST) Underground Railway Station Modification and Extension Works 
project was the first fully “open-book” target cost contract in Hong Kong. It attempted to 
make innovation and value engineering a priority backed by the gain-share/pain-share 
formula of the TCC process. The contract involved the connection of the pedestrian 
subway links of the new Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation (KCRC)1 East Tsim Sha 
Tsui Station to the existing Mass Transit Railway Corporation Ltd (MTRCL) Tsim Sha 
Tsui Station at the south end, and to improve passenger access and egress at the north end. 
The project entailed a single level extension to one end of the existing underground 
structure. The key objectives of the works were (Hong Kong Construction Innovation, 
2006): 
 
(1) to build subways linking to East Rail and forming an integral part of the Tsim Sha Tsui 
subway network for the commuters; 
(2) to relieve congestion and to improve station accessibility because of the increase in 
passengers and new commercial developments in the area; 
(3) to provide a better travelling environment for passengers; and 
(4) to provide convenient station access for passengers with special needs by constructing 
a passenger lift.  
 
This extension was constructed beneath Nathan Road, a major trunk road in one of the 
busiest districts of Hong Kong, within a cut and cover cofferdam. Other station 
modifications entailed significant alterations to the existing station structure whilst 
maintaining passenger flows at all times. The project consisted of deep excavation and 
pedestrian subway construction within a busy urban area. The excavation for the subway 
was as close as 1.5m above the crown of an operating underground railway tunnel and the 
temporary retaining structures at a similar distance from the side of the tunnels. The works 
were therefore executed with a high level of construction risk. Risk management and 
mitigation became an extremely critical issue to the success of this project. Apart from the 
MTRCL as the client organization and project manager, the project team was also 
                                                 
1
 KCRC merged with MTRCL in December 2007 and the Hong Kong SAR Government maintains a 
majority stake in the MTRCL. 
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composed of a Japanese main contractor, an electrical and mechanical engineering 
consultant, and various specialist subcontractors (e.g. instrumentation, cladding, steelwork, 
ceiling, etc). 
 
Motives behind introducing TCC  
 
The experience of an earlier Tseung Kwan O Underground Railway Extension (TKE) 
project has proved that the implementation of incentivisation agreement (IA) is beneficial 
to the overall project performance. IA is analogous to TCC in principle, where the client 
and the contractor mutually agreed at the start date that all remaining works from this 
agreed date will be calculated with an estimated cost for their risks with the gain-
share/pain-share arrangement. The advantage of IA lies in the incentives to make the 
contractor work efficiently and achieve cost saving. MTRCL considered that it would be a 
sensible decision to introduce incentive schemes to the Tsim Sha Tsui Underground 
Railway Station Modification and Extension Works project as well. After several rounds of 
searching and reviewing, the mechanism of a fully open-book target cost contracting 
scheme using the gain-share/pain-share philosophy was developed, with the purpose of 
achieving excellent project performance. The client also intended to implement this 
project as the benchmark model for their future target cost-based construction projects, 
especially those large-scale technically difficult contracts (e.g. West Island Underground 
Railway Line). 
 
Another conspicuous reason for introducing the TCC approach to the case study project 
was to provide financial incentives for the contractor to contribute and save cost by 
offering innovative ideas. Given the substantial uncertainties and the high risk profile of 
the project, adopting the traditional fixed-price lump-sum contract might result in a 
plethora of claims and poor working relationship amongst contracting parties. The 
implementation of TCC scheme through the gain-share/pain-share mechanism would 
achieve better certainty on time, cost and quality to the client and help encourage the 
contractor to focus on the management and mitigation of risks inherent with the project.  
 
In addition, it was intended to vastly improve the working relationships and bring in a 
more co-operative approach to conflict resolution. The client wished to align the overall 
project stakeholders’ objectives by providing the best overall solutions without 
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compromising the safety and operation of the railway while striking a realistic balance 
between the programme and total project cost (Dunn and Jones, 2004). Claims were also 
expected to be minimised via this alternative integrated procurement strategy. 
 
Tendering process and key features of TCC contract 
 
The main contract was awarded through a two-stage tendering process. At stage one, a 
total of seven pre-qualified contractors were invited to submit their tenders, consisting of a 
detailed technical proposal and a fee proposal with schedule certainty. A two-envelope 
tender assessment method was adopted for the development of a detailed proposal used for 
assessment at stage two. Adjudication mainly focused on the quality of the technical 
submission and achievement of the proposed schedule. Two potential contractors were 
shortlisted to the second stage whilst the unsuccessful contractors were reimbursed for 
administration expenses.  
 
The two shortlisted contractors were given three months and full access to the design team, 
with the aim of optimising the technical side of the scheme to achieve the best overall 
solutions. This included a value engineering exercise, a full-scale risk analysis and prudent 
consideration of all schedule issues to ensure the achievement of the target completion 
date. In parallel, the contractors were involved in the analysis and estimation of the target 
price for the contract. Subsequently, a senior management team of MTRCL adjudicated on 
the final proposals against a full marking regime to award the contract.  
 
Under the TCC arrangement, the client described the tender price quoted by the contractor 
as the initial target cost. During the contract execution stage, the contractor was paid the 
actual construction cost for the work done. A sum of money was set aside based on the risk 
quantification exercise as a contingency pool. Savings arising from the innovation, value 
engineering initiatives, management and mitigation of the shared works would go into the 
pool. However, any revision to the initial target cost due to the construction programme 
has to be agreed between the client and the contractor when the impacts and consequences 
of the instructions have been determined (Wong, 2006). A gain/pain share ratio between 
the client and the contractor was agreed at the early stage of the project. Consequently, the 
gain or pain within the pool at the end of the contract would be shared on a 50:50 basis as 
portrayed in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. The gain-share/pain-share arrangement for the Tsim Sha Tsui Underground 
Railway Station Modification and Extension Works [Adapted from Avery (2006)] 
 
The target cost contract operated by the client was on an “open-book” gain-share/pain-
share basis. The contractors were given specific instructions on areas of the bid where the 
costs were fixed and in particular the contractor’s preliminary costs. The addition for 
overhead and profit was fixed as a percentage at the outset. Based on a joint risk 
assessment conducted at tender stage, risks were reasonably allocated and suitable 
contingencies were identified, i.e. where the contractor accepted full responsibility for 
specific risks he would need to ensure that a suitable contingency was included in the 
tender price. For the client’s accepted risks, the TCC may be altered up or down based on 
a valuation of the risk impact.  
 
Measurement of time and cost performance 
 
Although the risk profile was enormous and the period for completion was exceptionally 
tight, the project was successfully completed in terms of both time and cost. The contract 
value of the project was initially set at HK$300 million2 as at April 2002 price with a 
contract period of 36 months. The final target cost3 had risen by HK$12.5 million to 
HK$312.5 million to take account of a number of variations. The final out-turn cost4 was 
contained to HK$297.7 million, which produced a gain share pot of HK$14.8 million 
                                                 
2
 Exchange rate: GBP1 = HK$15.50 as at April 2002 price 
3
 Final target cost: The initial target cost plus the target cost variations  
4
 Final out-turn cost: The expenditures on the project under pre-defined and permissible categories, actually 
incurred by the main contractor 
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(about 5% of cost saving). The time and cost profiles of the project are depicted in Figure 
4. The project was successfully completed in September 2005, i.e. seven months earlier 
than the contract completion date (about 20% of time saving). This case study effectively 
justified the use of alternative integrated contracting strategies that best align the project 
team’s ability to the risk profile of the project (Avery, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 4. The cost and time profiles of the Tsim Sha Tsui Underground Railway Station 
Modification and Extension Works [Adapted from Avery (2006)] 
 
Key benefits of adopting TCC 
 
The interviewees stressed that the target cost contracting scheme exercised more rigorous 
control over the tendering process, subcontract procurement, risk management, contract 
administration, as well as higher transparency for financial control and higher quality of 
information required for forward financial planning. These significantly contributed to the 
excellent project performance of the Tsim Sha Tsui Underground Railway Station 
Modification Works. In particular, through a proper performance-based remuneration, the 
contractor’s financial interests and those of the client become more closely collaborative 
and it is in the financial interests of both contracting parties to co-operate (Wong, 2006). 
 
The introduction of the gain-share approach, and more importantly the pain-share 
arrangement which is absent from the guaranteed maximum price (GMP) contracts, helped 
align the individual objectives of various project stakeholders to the overall objectives of 
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the project, and establish harmonious working relationships within an integrated project 
team. The agreements arose from the TCC contract and partnering initiatives that 
encouraged the client and the contractor to manage works together and shared any 
consequent benefits and losses. Project participants responded that more opportunities are 
available for them to express opinions and concerns openly and freely under the TCC 
arrangement. Ting (2006) also opined that the incentivisation agreement can create a more 
proactive, co-operative working atmosphere amongst the contracting parties and reinforces 
the cultural shift away from the traditional, adversarial approach to contracting. 
 
One profound advantage of the TCC approach in this project lies in the incentive to the 
contractor to work efficiently and to achieve cost saving, resulting in better value for 
money for the entire project development as advocated by Boukendour and Bah (2001). 
Expertise in project designs and innovations in both construction methods and materials 
were brought in from contractor to enhance the buildability of the project (Lam, 2002). 
Furthermore, a more equitable risk apportionment amongst project participants was 
offered when compared with the traditional procurement approach. The project required 
early involvement of the contractor in the design phase to assist in the identification and 
apportionment of risks (Dunn and Jones, 2004). The application of “open-book” 
accounting regime also enabled quantification of the risks and prevented the project risks 
from causing adverse effects on the contractor’s cash flow (Wong, 2006).  
 
Major difficulties in implementing TCC 
 
Subsequent to the decision of applying TCC to the selected project case, the rationale 
behind had to be explained to the directorate of MTRCL and the Hong Kong SAR 
Government as the major stakeholder. However, obtaining endorsement from the 
directorate was very demanding (Avery, 2006). Faced with a high risk profile of the 
project, the usual solution in Hong Kong would be a design-and-build lump-sum contract 
with the entire risks being passed onto the contractor. The difficulty was compounded 
primarily because a fully cost reimbursable target cost contract with the gain-share/pain-
share formula was unheard of in Hong Kong at that time. The TCC concepts were 
accepted by the management as it was assured that the issue of cost reimbursement would 
be monitored closely.  
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At tender stage, the project lacked a suitable form of contract for TCC within the MTRCL 
internal standard contract agreements. There was also a prime concern about the use of an 
unfamiliar form of contract such as the Engineering and Construction Contract. Changes 
were thus made to an existing MTRCL standard contract. As discussed by Sadler (2004), 
project participants might not be used to working in this novel way and may find it 
uncomfortable and difficult to change the traditional way they work. Gander and Hemsley 
(1997) also stated that the absence of standard form of TCC contract would result in a 
greater possibility of drafting errors and misunderstanding of liabilities between various 
contracting parties. During the construction stage, disputes arose because Architects / 
Engineers Instructions arbitrarily constituted target cost variations or were deemed to be 
classified as design development due to unclear scope of work (Chan et al., 2007b). 
However, adjudication meetings involving representatives from the client, engineer and 
main contractor were launched together with the partnering facilitator and relevant 
contracting parties to resolve controversial issues and intractable disputes.  
 
Critical success factors for TCC 
 
Interviewees shared a unanimous view that the overall project success was contributed by 
the fairly good working relationships amongst various project stakeholders and the target 
cost procurement approach, which had assisted in establishing mutual objectives, common 
interests and an open-book accounting environment. A partnering consultant was 
appointed to facilitate the team building, enhance communication amongst the project 
team members and to monitor project progress on a regular basis. Building integrated and 
committed teams can facilitate the accomplishment of smooth project delivery as well as 
an equitable risk sharing mechanism. The application of a “shared” site office for the 
whole project team further catalysed the communication and integration amongst the 
contracting parties under a teamwork culture. Tay et al. (2000) stressed that for a target 
cost contract to be successful, there must be a genuine willingness to achieve co-operation 
or demonstrate partnering spirit between the collaborating parties. 
 
A right selection of project team is therefore essential in facilitating mutual trust, effective 
communication, efficient co-ordination and productive conflict resolution (Chan et al., 
2004). Under the TCC arrangement of this project case, the client was involved in 
subcontractor selection and a similar target cost contractual arrangement had also been 
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entered into for the mechanical and electrical subcontractors. Strong leadership and 
proactive contractor was also of paramount importance to deal with any unexpected issues 
and potential disputes, and the choice made by all involved would either make or 
potentially break the strategy and the processes necessary for real success (Avery, 2006).  
 
Another significant element of the TCC procurement strategy was the transparency of the 
entire project development process. The project stakeholders decided from the outset that 
there was to be one set of records for the project team and this was implemented since the 
initial project stage. Mutual trust and close working relationship were therefore critical in 
accomplishing the “open-book” accounting regime. In addition, because of this unique 
arrangement of the target cost approach based on joint determination and agreement 
between the client and the contractor on the allocation of shared risks, the client 
recognised the essence of realistic target cost estimates, which would include appropriate 
risk contingencies under the pain-share/gain-share mechanism. 
 
Sadler (2004) recommended that clients should evaluate the combination of fee and share 
not only the risks fairly, but also to ensure that the incentive is of sufficient value to 
motivate the contractor. Perry and Barnes (2000) put forth a strong case for avoiding 
setting the contractor’s share at less than 50%. Tang and Lam (2003) proposed various 
percentages of shares for target cost-based contracts between the client and the contractor 
depending on the extent of cost saving achieved as indicated in Table 1. Broome and Perry 
(2002) further suggested that an appropriate contracting strategy should aim to align the 
motivations of the parties so as to maximise the likelihood of project objectives being 
achieved, taking account of the constraints and risks that act on the project and the 
strengths and weaknesses of the parties participating in it. However, different contract and 
incentive structures are required to meet differing project objectives and circumstances 
(Bower et al., 2002). 
 
Summary of lessons learned 
 
Based on the above qualitative analysis on the case study, the major interview findings are 
summarised in Table 2. 
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Table 1. Suggested share saving percentage apportionment for target cost-type contracts 
[Adapted from Tang and Lam (2003)] 
Scenario Client’s share Contractor’s share 
Final out-turn cost < Final target cost   
(a) Saving < 5% 67% 33% 
(b) Saving = 5-10% 50% 50% 
(c) Saving > 10% 33% 67% 
 
Table 2. Summary of the primary attributes associated with TCC scheme for the Tsim Sha 
Tsui Underground Railway Station Modification and Extension Works 
Project 
nature 
Underground railway station modification and extension works involving the connection 
of the pedestrian subway links in Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong 
Contracting 
approach 
Target Cost Contracting (TCC) approach using two-stage tendering process 
Gain-share 
arrangement 
Client : Contractor = 50 : 50 
Pain-share 
arrangement 
Client : Contractor = 50 : 50 
Underlying 
motives 
 To achieve excellent project performance 
 To generate financial incentives for the contractor to contribute and save cost by 
offering innovative ideas  
 To improve working relationship through partnering spirit 
 To introduce a more co-operative approach to conflict resolution and minimise claims 
 To align individual objectives of various contracting parties with the overall project 
objectives 
Key benefits  Provision of financial incentives for contractor to work efficiently and to achieve cost 
saving 
 More rigorous control over tendering process, subcontract procurement, risk 
management and contract administration 
 Higher transparency for financial control and higher quality of information exchange 
 Harmonious working relationship within the project team via partnering arrangement 
 Development of common overall project goals amongst various project stakeholders 
 Enhanced buildability of project design 
 More equitable risk apportionment between client and contractor 
Major 
difficulties 
 Unfamiliarity with or misunderstanding of TCC concepts and practices by senior 
management  
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 Lack of a suitable form of contract for TCC in the local context 
 Dispute (claim) occurrence due to unclear scope of work in client’s project brief 
Critical 
success 
factors 
 Good working relationship and right selection of project team 
 Shared objectives with common interests  
 Open-book accounting arrangement in support of tender pricing by contractor 
 Strong leadership and proactive contractor 
 Transparency of the entire project development process 
 
Conclusions 
 
Target cost contracting (TCC) scheme aims to develop a co-operative teamwork spirit 
based on a partnering working relationship, which has been globally recommended as an 
appropriate means of realising high risk construction projects. To provide sufficient 
groundwork for construction clients to establish a best practice framework for TCC 
scheme in future construction projects, this study has reported on the TCC form of 
procurement strategy via a triumphant project in Hong Kong: the “Tsim Sha Tsui 
Underground Railway Station Modification and Extension Works”. The TCC applications 
and key features, motives, benefits, difficulties and success factors of implementing the 
TCC scheme are explored and discussed through a couple of face-to-face interviews with 
senior representatives from the client organisation.  
 
The target cost-type procurement approach derives a multitude of benefits to the delivery 
of the selected project case, including cost incentives for contractor to work efficiently and 
aligning individual objectives of various project stakeholders with the overall project 
objectives due to the presence of a gain-share/pain-share mechanism. Its essence and 
operational framework is worthy of industry-wide attention, and project participants could 
be bestowed full benefits from its implementation. An evaluation of the TCC case study 
project is likely to lead to a better appreciation of TCC practices and to generate essential 
strategies to alleviate the root causes of poor project performance and the win-lose 
consequence. Although the implementation practices reported from the case study 
represent findings which are primarily related to Hong Kong, the research outcomes and 
lessons learned on the perceptions and the assessment of project performance are valuable 
to key project stakeholders in overseas countries as well for their implementation of TCC 
schemes in future construction projects. 
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In order to obtain a more balanced overview of the success/failure of the case project, it is 
recommended that more in-depth interviews with other contracting parties (e.g. main 
contractor, mechanical and electrical engineering consultant and the team of trade 
subcontractors) should be launched to solicit their perceptions and feedback on the TCC 
arrangement. The case study findings are particularly useful in developing best practices 
and generating effective practical guidelines or strategies for the successful 
implementation of target cost contracts for the construction industry, both locally and 
overseas. Further research can be planned to investigate more TCC case studies in future 
to confirm the underlying motives, perceived benefits, potential difficulties and essential 
successful ingredients as determined from this study. In addition, future research is 
recommended for comparing the performance of projects procured using TCC and 
performance-based contracting (PBC) options between the construction industry and other 
industries such as the logistics field and service sector in order to produce best practice 
guidelines for implementation. 
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